

Deprivation, Governance Deficit and the Dudula Movement: Understanding Social Cohesion and Collective Violence in Alexandra

Brian Murahwa and Jean Pierre Misago
November 2025

Table Of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION.....	3
1.1 OVERVIEW	3
1.2 METHODS AND DATA SOURCES	3
II. FINDINGS	
2.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	5
2.2 SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGES	6
2.2.1 Sociodemographic Characteristics.....	6
2.2.2 Socio-Economic Challenges	7
2.2.2.1 Poor And Unsatisfactory Service Delivery	7
2.2.2.2 Unemployment And Hustling For Livelihoods	9
2.2.2.3 Crime As A ‘Livelihood Activity’	11
2.3 LOCAL AUTHORITY, COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION	14
2.3.1 Authority And Leadership Structures	14
2.3.2 Community Relationship With Institutions Of Authority And Leadership	16
2.4 COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE	18
2.4.1 Political Violence	18
2.4.2 Violence Against Foreign Nationals	19
2.4.3 Taxi Violence.....	20
2.4.4 Gang Violence.....	21
2.4.5 Mob Justice	22
2.4.6 Violence Service Delivery Protests.....	22
III. CONCLUSION	23
REFERENCES	25

I. Introduction

1.1 OVERVIEW

This report presents findings of research conducted by the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) in the Alexandra Township (Johannesburg, South Africa) in April and October 2022. Conducted as part of -and for- the Kagisano programme, this research builds on -and updates- an original study conducted in the same area in 2017. The output of the 2017 study was the [Alexandra Case Study Report](#) (hereinafter referred to as the 'original report'). As an update of the original research, the current report should be read together with the above-mentioned detailed original report.

Like the original study, this research aims to identify obstacles to -and opportunities for- social cohesion to inform interventions to address collective or group-based violence and foster social cohesion in 16 selected sites and the country. Social cohesion generally refers to the ability of different population groups and people to peacefully live together differently (Freedom House, 2017). Updating the original research was important to assess whether there may have been significant changes in the empirical reality in the targeted, highly mobile and fluid communities, and by doing so, ensure that new interventions are not based on outdated data and information. Further, the new research envisaged to collect additional baseline qualitative and quantitative data. This baseline data is not available in original reports but is required for the new, planned community-based programmes.

This report comprises three main sections. The first section provides a brief discussion of the research methods and data methods. The second section provides a summary and detailed presentation and analysis of the research findings. The last and concluding section reflects on the implications of the research findings for the promotion of social cohesion and the prevention of collective violence.

1.2 METHODS AND DATA SOURCES

Findings discussed in this report are informed by three main data sources: i) desktop research or review of literature on relevant research themes, ii) qualitative interviews with key informants and general observations, and iii) community-based and targeted quantitative surveys.

In-depth face to face interviews and general observations were carried out in the area by a team of four researchers in April 2022. The team conducted a total of thirteen interviews with purposively sampled key informants. Targeted key informants for this research were leaders or representatives of organisations and institutions living, working in or familiar with the community. These include amongst others: faith-based

organisations, women organisations, youth organisations, civic and political organisations, sports and cultural groups, business fora or associations, stokvels and self-help organisations, labour unions, advocacy groups, school and student bodies, migrant organisations, international NGOs, the police, CPF, ward council, street communities, amongst others.

The research targeted key informants for two reasons: (i) to get a sense of their own experience living and/working in the community, and (ii) to ask them about the community experience i.e. to draw on their situated knowledge, perspective and professional experience to reflect and share information on community's lived experiences about specific research themes (see interview guide in Annex II).

In addition to qualitative interviews, the research used community-based and targeted surveys to collect quantitative data (see summary of survey data in Annex I). While digital, the surveys were administered by enumerators either in person or telephonically in October 2022. In Alex, the surveys collected answers from a total of 215 participants.

Although the research focused on wards 75 and 107, participants indicated that what is happening in these sites is indicative of what is happening in other parts of Alex.

II. Findings

2.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Alex, a highly diverse and rapidly growing community, is home to different population groups both citizens and foreign. With rapid urbanisation and population growth far outpacing service delivery, people in Alex often compete for resources and often form relationships that are characterised by a combination of conflict and violence (and to some extent, coalescence) not only among themselves but with local institutions of authority and leadership. This research identifies the following main factors that affect social cohesion and have a direct or indirect causal relationship with collective violence:

1. ***Socio-economic hardships:*** Alex residents face severe socio-economic challenges including, amongst others, shortages of public services due to poor services delivery, high unemployment rate, poverty, high crime rates, (collective and individual) violence, gangsterism and drug abuse. The Covid-19 pandemic has made these already severe hardships even more bitterly felt. High unemployment rates -and resulting poverty- has made crime (often violent) a livelihood activity for many (particularly among the youth) in Alex.

Socio-economic challenges are an obstacle to social cohesion particularly when they (at least some) are blamed on outsiders, as is the case in Alex. Poor service delivery, which residents attribute to incompetence and corruption by the local authority and leadership, leads to two types of collective violence: violent service delivery protests, and ii) xenophobic violence that often follows these protests.

2. ***Deficits in formal local governance and shift towards informalisation of community leadership:*** This research finds a general lack of trust and working relationship between Alex residents and the formal or official institutions of authority and leadership, particularly the police and ward councils. This is because residents perceive these institutions as unable or unwilling to help them address numerous issues of concern such as service delivery-related matters, crime, conflict resolution, etc. Perhaps, this explains why the general mood among Alex residents is often characterised by frustrations, anger, and disappointments.

This broken trust between residents and the formal local governance has led many opting to rather engage with informal community leaders who seem to respond timeously to their concerns. This marks a shift from a reliance on formal authority and leadership to an informal governance and

leadership system. In addition to leading residents to rely on informal leadership structures to address conflicts and other issues of concern, the 'absence' of -or deficits in formal governance, and the resulting lack of formal conflict resolution mechanisms, is also forcing Alex residents to take matters into their own hands. For example, Alex residents often use mob justice to deal with criminals because they do not trust the police and the justice system, whom they often regard as corrupt and ineffective.

Deficits in formal local governance is a driver of collective violence in two ways: i) it leads to the normalisation of mob justice (a type of collective violence) as an accepted means of addressing crime, and ii) formal leadership vacuums lead to the emergency of informal leadership groups that often use violence (e.g. violent service protests and xenophobic violence) to protect their lucrative (not voluntary) leadership positions (Misago 2017).

3. **Collective violence:** Collective or group violence is a common and longstanding feature of everyday life in the Alex. The most common forms of group violence in the township include political violence, xenophobic violence, taxi violence, mob justice, gang violence, and violent service delivery protests. Collective violence is the most visible manifestation of social cohesion fault lines. It is also an obstacle to social cohesion as it exacerbates group tensions and undermines the prospects of peaceful interactions and cohabitation.

The findings discussed above and throughout this report suggest that, to be successful, any programme whose aim is to promote social cohesion and prevent collective violence in Alex will need to address the obstacles the research identifies. They (findings) also suggest that, as these obstacles are interconnected and feed on each other, they must preferably be tackled simultaneously through a multipronged, multi-partner approach.

2.2 SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

2.2.1 Sociodemographic characteristics

Alexandra (hereinafter referred to as Alex) is the oldest and one of the most densely populated townships in Johannesburg. It was established in 1912 and covers an area of 800 hectares. Since its establishment, Alex has witnessed high rates of population growth due to a combination of both natural increase and migration. A township that was initially planned for a population of about 70 000 upon its establishment is now home to over 700 000 people (Mafisa 2019). With an average population density of more than 26,000/square km, Alex is one of the most overcrowded townships in South Africa (StatsSA 2011; City Population n.d.).

Alexandra is a township of predominantly Black Africans who constitute 99% of the entire population. The majority of these (93%) are South Africans. While IsiZulu is the main spoken language in Alex, other local

languages such as Pedi, Xhosa, Venda, Tsonga, Sotho, and English are also common. Alex is home to a diverse foreign population (approximately 5%), mainly consisting of Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Malawians, Ethiopians, Pakistanis, and Somalis. Overall, Alex is a culturally and linguistically diverse township. A detailed discussion on Alex's sociodemographic characteristics and population group interactions is available in the [original report](#).

2.2.2 Socio-economic challenges

According to respondents, Alex residents still face bitterly felt socio-economic challenges, including, amongst others, poor service delivery, high unemployment rate, high crime rates, violence, and drug and substance abuse.

2.2.2.1 Poor and unsatisfactory service delivery

Alex, like many other post-apartheid South African urban areas is confronted by serious challenges of service delivery. In these urban areas, which are nodes of economic activities, the demand for services like housing, water, electricity and roads, among others, is increasing due to rapid rates of urbanisation (Harrison, Masson, and Sinwell 2014).

Housing shortages

According to participants and our own observations, housing remains one of the major challenges faced by the Alex residents. Because of an unplanned population expansion, Alex has witnessed an increase in informal settlements, backyard shack development, and overcrowding in formal houses and in the hostels. According to one participant, Alex's population grows everyday both from internal and foreign immigrants. He said: "People come to settle here every day from different parts of the country. From Limpopo to KZN to Eastern Cape. Nigerians, Mozambicans, Zimbabweans, Basothos from Lesotho are also coming to stay here every day."¹

According to participants, what makes Alex attractive to immigrants, both local and foreign, is its strategic location relatively close to major economic hubs such as Johannesburg, Sandton, and other surrounding areas. The population, therefore, continues to grow each year in Alex. Data from the 2011 census, for instance, estimated Alex's population to be around 350 000 – 400 000 but today, that number has more than doubled.²

The unplanned and ever-growing Alex's population has not only put a strain on housing but other services as well including sanitation, roads, and electricity. Participants expressed that they often experience low water

¹ Interview, Thabiso, 19 April 2022

² Ibid. see also Mafisa (2019)

pressures and frequently blocked and overflowing sewer systems. They added that the maintenance of such systems is often made difficult by the high densities and congested nature of shack development, which makes access by city authorities' problematic. Asked to comment about the state of service delivery in Alex, one participant said: "If you know about the history of Alex, you will notice that the residential stands were initially designed for one family. Today, you can find 20 families or more living in the shacks in a single yard. Some structures are even built on top of sewer pipes".³

Apart from the backyard shack development, Alex has witnessed an increase of informal settlers over the years, especially along the Juskei Jukskei river, as the demand for housing continues to exceed supply. Swetjla, a popular informal settlement developed along the Jukskei riverbank, often experiences challenges associated with flooding and other environmental problems, including pollution.

Policing and law enforcement

Apart from challenges associated with housing, policing in Alex is also a huge problem. For instance, participants noted that Alex, with its population nearing one million inhabitants, is serviced by a single police station. One participant summed up the state of policing in Alex as follows:

...on issues of policing, the police in Alex cannot do anything. It is like putting one policeman to guard about ten thousand [10 000] people. You are having a problem of a population of over nine hundred thousand [900 000] people and fewer police and with little resources. Many places are selling drugs (nyaope) and so forth and police cannot be everywhere. There are also shopping centres where they are asked to come. Then you have JMPD, which, of course are well well-resourced, but they are not doing their work. According to JMPD ten plus⁴ we are supposed to have two cars per municipal ward. They are not going into wards anymore; they would rather go around shopping centres looking for chicken feet, I guess, to eat and get bribes and stuff like that.⁵

The excerpt above not only highlights the under-resourcing of policing services in Alex, but it also speaks to the general perception that the public has towards police, that they are perceived to be corrupt. As the other parts of this report will show, this public perception has resulted in the public's lack of confidence in the police. Participants further expressed concern over the capacity and effectiveness of only one court to serve nearly a million population of Alex. As one participant put it:

Most of the time, cases are postponed or delayed at the courts. I work closely with the police, and they always complain that there are many pending cases at court because they are often overwhelmed. Every day, people go and open cases at the police but end up withdrawing them

³ Interview, Vincent, 21 April 2022

⁴ JMPD ten plus is a sector/ward-based policing


⁵ Interview, Thabo, 19 April 2022

because they say it will not change anything. Some have opted for out-of-court settlements, and at the hostels, some cases are resolved by the indunas.⁶

Service delivery challenges persist despite government promises to address them. The Alexandra Renewal Project, an urban renewal project which was commissioned by the then President, Thabo Mbeki in 2001, has not done much in terms of meeting some of its key objectives, including addressing housing challenges and other service-related problems in Alexandra. Some participants expressed that the project was marred with controversies, corruption, and looting of funds, hence it failed to meet its intended objectives. One participant said: “The Alexandra Renewal Project was a very good initiative with good intentions, but it got into the hands of greedy politicians and the corrupt ‘business’ people who managed to put their hands in the cookie jar of the project. Millions were stolen, and here we are, the problems continue to persist.”⁷

Alex residents are generally not satisfied with service delivery in the area. Indeed, of 215 surveyed residents, 85% felt either that service delivery was getting worse or had not improved in the recent past. Of these participants, 23 % and 44% never and only sometimes engage with the formal local structures to address service delivery concerns (see Figure 1).

As elsewhere, poor service delivery (real or perceived) has often resulted in collective violence in the form of violent service delivery protests, which in turn result in violence against foreign nationals.



2.2.2.2 Unemployment and hustling for livelihoods

Alex has one of the highest unemployment rates in Gauteng and nationally. Recent statistics (Q2: 2022) show that Alex has an official unemployment rate of 37%, which is above the provincial (Gauteng) of 34.4% and the national rate of 33.9%.⁸ Poverty levels in Alex are high, with 27% of households having no income at all and almost 37% of the households having an annual income of below R9 600 (Stats SA 2011). Detailed socio-economic indicators are available in the original report.

⁶ Interview, CPF representative, 19 April 2022

⁷ Interview, Thabo, 19 April 2022

⁸ <https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2022.pdf>

Participants indicated that, with limited employment opportunities, most Alex residents hustle to survive. One participant responded when asked how people get by daily: “[...] hustle, trust me, hustle, in Alex, you need to know your way around hustling. If you don’t know how to hustle, you are not going to make it. If you don’t know how to kick a door and say I want this, you are not going to make it. We hustle in different ways here in Alex just to put food on the table.”⁹

Echoing similar sentiments, another participant stated:

You see, here in Alex, we hustle. Go to the Pan African Mall, you will see how people try to survive by selling different things on the streets. People here have mastered the art of survival. We are survivalists. People do piece jobs, most women engage in domestic work in nearby suburbs, young people engage in different activities, some of them informal and illegal, just to survive.¹⁰

From the above excerpts, there seems to be a general consensus that the majority of the Alex residents make a living through hustling. Hustling, as understood by the respondents, involved participating in street economies and a wide range of other informal economic activities, some ‘illegal’, such as crime and prostitution. Even those who are formally employed in nearby locations such as Sandton and Linbro Park, equally engage in ‘*side hustles*’ to supplement their meagre incomes. Among the ‘side hustles’ are gambling activities at local betting shops, especially at the Pan Africa Mall. Others, participants noted, bet on their mobile cell phones. Waste recycling also feeds into Alex’s ‘hustling economy’.

The high unemployment rates coupled with high levels of poverty breed a conducive environment for different types of criminal activities, both petty and serious. For Alex’s youth, all these criminal activities form part of Alex’s hustling economy (see later discussion on crime).

Apart from participating in the ‘hustling economy’, many households in Alex survive on government grants. These include, among others, grants for older persons, children, people living with disabilities and the Social Relief of Distress grants. Participants highlighted that these grants are a significant source of income for desperate residents. One participant stated:

Go to Alex Mall during the payout days and you will see the desperation on people’s faces. As early as 5 am, there are queues already at the mall. People have limited options here. I do not think that anyone would like to live on the mercy of the government.¹¹

⁹ Interview, Viny, 21 April 2022

¹⁰ Interview, Siza, 20 April 2022

¹¹ Interview, Lebo, 21 April 2022

Since the dawn of democracy, South Africa has seen a steady increase in the number of people who rely on grants.¹² In the year 1996/1997, an estimated 7% of the population had access to grants. By 2019/20, this figure had risen to 31% (BusinessTech 2020). The devastating economic effects of COVID-19 also contributed to an increase in the demand for and uptake of social grants across the country. Statistics released by the Brookings Institution revealed that more than half of the country's population were beneficiaries of social grants, especially after the introduction of the Special Covid Grant (Bhorat and Kohler 2020). By the end of March in 2021, Gauteng had recorded the highest increase in social grant uptake compared to other provinces (SASSA 2021).

2.2.2.3 Crime as a 'livelihood activity'

High and increasing crime rates are another serious challenge that Alex residents face. Indeed, recent crime stats (Q2: 2022) show that Alex is one of the areas most affected by crime in the country. For all 17 Community Reported Serious Crimes, Alex is ranked 20th nationally and 8th in Gauteng province.¹³ As Table I below indicates, in Q2 of 2022, high crime rates have already increased for many crime categories.

Corroborating the above statistics, respondents indicated that Alex is one of the South African townships notorious for different forms of crime. For most participants, economic hardships are the main driver of crime in the area. For many residents, particularly the youth, crime is the only livelihood option, and forms part of the hustling economy as discussed earlier. One participant noted: "People engage in criminal activities because they have run out of options to survive. There are very limited economic opportunities here in Alex. It is very difficult for people to survive with no jobs. Some of them end up committing crimes."¹⁴

Some participants hinted at the link between crime and migrants. They opined that, like local citizens, many of the immigrants are involved in various criminal activities to survive. Said one participant: "Another problem is the influx of foreign nationals. To be honest, a lot of them are undocumented and they commit crimes just to make sure that they eat."¹⁵ Other respondents attributed the increase in criminal activities to the invisibility of the police force (see later discussions on community leadership and conflict resolution).

¹² It suffices to note that the increase may also be attributed to the fact that very few, if any black people, had access to grants during the apartheid era.

¹³ Stas SA, 2022. https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P0211&SCH=73290

¹⁴ Interview, Swaz, 20 April 2022

¹⁵ Interview, Thabiso, 19 April 2022

Table I: Alex crime stats Q2 (April-June) 2022¹⁶

CRIME CATEGORY	April to June 2018	April to June 2019	April to June 2020	April to June 2021	April to June 2022	Count Diff	% Change
CONTACT CRIMES (CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON)							
Murder	14	28	12	26	34	8	30.8%
Sexual Offences	29	45	30	54	35	-19	-35.2%
Attempted murder	5	18	16	16	29	13	81.3%
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	125	135	89	163	163	0	0.0%
Common assault	207	164	197	316	287	-29	-9.2%
Common robbery	43	39	28	55	64	9	16.4%
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	199	223	149	184	245	61	33.2%
Total Contact Crimes (Crimes Against The Person)	622	652	521	814	857	43	5.3%
Total Sexual Offences							
Rape	24	37	25	42	29	-13	-31.0%
Sexual Assault	4	6	4	11	6	-5	-45.5%
Attempted sexual offences	1	2	0	1	0	-1	-100.0%
Contact sexual offences	0	0	1	0	0	0	0 Count
Total Sexual Offences	29	45	30	54	35	-19	-35.2%
SOME SUBCATEGORIES OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY							
Carjacking	45	45	17	44	63	19	43.2%
Robbery at residential premises	4	19	7	28	19	-9	-32.1%
Robbery at non-residential premises	15	18	14	12	16	4	33.3%
Bank Robbery	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 Count
Robbery of cash in transit	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 Count
Truck hijacking	0	0	0	0	1	1	1 Count Higher
CONTACT-RELATED CRIMES							
Arson	1	2	2	1	5	4	400.0%
Malicious damage to property	79	92	71	153	144	-9	-5.9%
Total Contact-Related Crimes	80	94	73	154	149	-5	-3.2%
PROPERTY-RELATED CRIMES							
Burglary at non-residential premises	23	18	33	35	5	-30	-85.7%
Burglary at residential premises	86	93	64	62	67	5	8.1%
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	35	43	17	27	36	9	33.3%
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	43	57	31	39	22	-17	-43.6%
Stock-theft	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 Count
Total Property-Related Crimes	187	211	145	163	130	-33	-20.2%
OTHER SERIOUS CRIMES							
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	164	176	109	178	192	14	7.9%
Commercial crime	19	22	17	35	35	0	0.0%
Shoplifting	49	50	38	43	31	-12	-27.9%
Total Other Serious Crimes	232	248	164	256	258	2	0.8%
Total 17 Community Reported Serious Crimes	1,121	1,205	903	1,387	1,394	7	0.5%
CRIME DETECTED AS A RESULT OF POLICE ACTION							
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	18	18	11	13	9	-4	-30.8%
Drug-related crime	223	24	18	36	51	15	41.7%
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	94	65	1	50	68	18	36.0%
Sexual offences detected as a result of police action	0	0	1	0	0	0	0 Count
Total Crime Detected As A Result Of Police Action	335	107	31	99	128	29	29.3%

Participants also mentioned the lack of recreational facilities and sporting activities as another driver of crime in the community. As part of its housing projects, the Department of Housing took over a stadium in Ward 75

¹⁶ Stas SA, 2022. https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P0211&SCH=73290


next to Madala Hostels and erected temporary housing structures. This, according to one of the participants, has restricted sporting and other recreational activities for the residents. She had this to say:

We used to have traditional singing and dancing activities in the grounds, but the Department of Housing took the football ground, so we no longer have soccer; it's where we used to host our tournaments. Now these kids are just roaming around the streets with nothing to entertain them. Sport at least takes them off criminal activities and drugs.¹⁷

Crime and violence against women and girls

Respondents indicated that crime against women and girls, particularly gender-based violence, is a serious concern for Alex residents. Indeed, as Table I above shows, Alex had 35 sexual offences, including 29 rape cases, reported to the police in Q2 of 2022.¹⁸ With these figures, Alex is ranked 10th and 14th for rape and sexual assault crimes respectively in the province.

Respondents indicated that police stats do not match the reality because of the silence around gender-based violence and the resulting underreporting. Indeed, 76% of surveyed residents (n=109) reported knowing at least one woman or a girl who has been a victim of violent crime in Alex (Figure 2). Of surveyed women and girls (n=40), 83 % reported that violent crimes against women and girls were a major problem in Alex, and 60% do not generally feel safe in the township.



Socio-economic challenges are an obstacle to social cohesion, particularly when they (at least some) are blamed on outsiders, as is the case in Alex. Poor service delivery, which residents attribute to incompetence and corruption by the local authority and leadership, leads to two types of collective violence: violent service delivery protests, and ii) xenophobic violence that often follows these protests.

¹⁷ Interview, Ma'am Dudu, 21 April 2022

¹⁸ Stas SA, 2022. https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P0211&SCH=73290

2.3 LOCAL AUTHORITY, COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

2.3.1 Authority and leadership structures

Alex, like similar communities elsewhere, is led by diverse institutions of authority and leadership (both formal and informal). These include ward councils, SAPS, political parties, civic organisations, business forums, and the community policing forum (CPF) among others.

By and large, Alex community leadership seems to follow the community's population spatial distribution as differentiated by ethnic groups. For instance, at the hostels, a largely Zulu area, Indunas command respect and recognition than any other leaders and authorities, including the police, civic organisations and political parties other than the IFP. According to participants, disputes at the hostels are often solved internally by the Indunas unless the severity of the case is deemed to require police intervention. Asked to explain how conflict is managed at the hostels, one participant said: "The leadership structure - 'Induna'- sits down and resolve the issue because if it's not resolved it escalates to violence, so it's either we sit down and find the solution to the matter to prevent blood shed...there are cases such as rape that we often refer to the police."¹⁹

According to participants, the hostel dwellers tend to trust Indunas because they lack trust in the police and state justice systems. Speaking on condition of anonymity, one participant said:

I want to go back to your question about the police, the police here at Madala Hostel have not been treating us very well, [...] you'll go report a case, let's say you report it at 3 pm or 4 pm. You will wait until 4 am the next day in the morning. They tell you that there are no vans. If there is an honest cop, they will tell you straight that, 'sorry, we do not enter Madala Hostel, cops that enter Madala Hostel are Zulu speaking cops only'. You will find that people are fighting here, and we call the police, we will wait for them for hours and hours until someone gets murdered. The police are not servicing us here at the hostel, when we ask why, they say we are a violent community...²⁰

The sentiments above reveal not only the ineffectiveness of the police but also the ethnic politics that characterise policing in Alexandra. That only Zulu-speaking police can police Madala hostels gives the impression that the hostels do not fall under the jurisdiction of Alex SAPS.²¹ This is concerning, particularly in a community known for high rates of crime and violence.

Beyond the hostels where indunas maintain a very strong leadership, participants identified political parties, civic organisations, religious groups, street committees, community policing forum (CPF), SAPS and 'philanthropists' as key leaders in the community. One of the most popular and respected leaders in Alexandra

¹⁹ Interview, Dudu, 21 April 2022

²⁰ Interview, anonymous, 21 April 2022

²¹ Madala hostel falls under ward 75 in Alexandra, one of the wards that were targeted for this research.

is Cde Linda Twala, who is regarded by many as the Father of the Nation of Alex²² not only because of his history and liberation credentials, but also because of his philanthropic work. According to him, he is widely respected and popular because he serves the community without discriminating on the basis of nationality, race, class, ethnicity, or any other distinctions. He said: “...when someone comes in through the gate hungry, my duty is to serve and give them food, whether he comes from what group, ethnicity, it is none of my business.”²³

Leaders in the community, participants expressed, are those who show up during times of crisis and help the community. When COVID-19 started in 2020, Cde Twala was one of the very few people who helped many poor families with food handouts in Alexandra.²⁴ In many of the interviews that we did, his philanthropic work and his ability to bring different organisations together (in times of conflict and violence) are well acknowledged. According to respondents, community members tend to value, appreciate, and support leaders who are actively involved in community activities; people who have a long history with the community and leaders who show up when the community needs them, for instance to address problems associated with service delivery, crime, violence, and poverty among others.

Women and leadership

Despite the gains that have been made since the dawn of the democracy regarding a fair representation of women across different sectors, the percentage of women in leadership and decision-making positions remains relatively small (Kuagbedzi, Dhlamini, and Njenga 2022). For especially women of colour, they remain marginalised and entangled in what has been referred to as the ‘masculinities of power’ (Phakeng 2015). This research confirms this predicament. Indeed, our findings indicate that there are many political and non-political organisations in Alex whose compositions are largely dominated by women. However, despite being the majority in terms of membership or composition, there are only a few women who occupy leadership and decision-making positions.

One major exception is at the Madala Hostels, where many of the influential decisions regarding the daily activities at the hostels and linkages between the hostel and the ‘other’ wider community are presided over by a female Induna. The hostel is still largely dominated by men. Commenting about her experiences of being an induna at a hostel largely dominated by men, Ma’am Dudu said:

²² <https://mg.co.za/article/2019-07-01-linda-twala-the-father-of-the-nation-of-alex/>

²³ Interview, Baba Twala, 20 April 2022


²⁴ Interview, Thabo, 19 April 2022

Being a woman in this space (of leadership) is very challenging. At times, you hear men saying they will never listen to us because we are women, there is nothing we can tell them. They swear at me every day, these men, they always say to me, where have you ever seen a female leader 'Induna'? We will never be ruled by a woman, but most of the issues are solved by me here at the hostel. The other Indunas I am leading this hostel with are always in conflict, and I am the one who always acts as a go-between and resolves their differences.²⁵

Notwithstanding the exception above, women leaders are still marginalised and trapped in the masculinities of power. In almost all the conducted interviews, there was a general sense that women occupy leadership positions on paper, but the majority of the decisions are made by their male counterparts. Reflecting on her experiences as one of the SANCO leaders, one female participant said: "The organization is male-dominated, women are still placed for gender quota reasons, and men still don't know how to react when met with capable women in our organisations. It is tough to make decisions without consulting men in the organisation."²⁶ It was only in organisations that were established by women for women that decision were made independently by them. Most of the organisations that are led by women in Alex are non-profit organisations that deal with caring for vulnerable groups such as children, drug addicts, and the victims of gender-based violence.

2.3.2 Community relationship with institutions of authority and leadership

According to respondents, distrust, perceptions of incompetence, and corruption characterise the relationship (or lack thereof) between Alex residents and the formal or official institutions of authority and leadership, particularly the police and the ward councillor. Indeed, 71% and 57% of surveyed residents (n=109) do not trust the police and the ward councillor, respectively (Figure 3).



Commenting on the relationship between the community and the police, one participant said:

That's why I'm saying there is no relationship between us and the police. And it's headed to a point where we would have to expose the police because if I report that I know someone who is selling drugs, yet in half an hour they would be out on the street, why would I even bother reporting them? So, hence I'm saying in the next few weeks we are going to close the police station because it's evident now that they are the ones perpetrating crime in the township. So, if we start with them, then we will

²⁵ Interview, Ma'am Dudu, 21 April 2022

²⁶ Interview, Swaz, 20 April 2022

be dealing with the issue of corruption. So that when we catch these criminals and we take them to jail, they stay there.²⁷

Another participant stated that residents are disappointed in the councillor and his team due to poor service delivery. He indicated, for example, that he mobilises young people and the community at large to clean the Jukskei River and park, something the councillor and his 'comrades' have failed to do. He said:


We are very disappointed in our councillor. There are issues that the councillor is not addressing. We have a blocked manhole that has a very bad odour. The smell there kills. Children used to come here to the Art Center and the park and used the swings. People would come chill and rest here at the park, but now it's no longer happening because the odour is bad, especially when it's raining, even when you are here, you can smell it. We are fortunate to have a river close by, but now that river (Jukskei) is a curse. All the rubbish is thrown there, dead bodies are thrown there. The Jukskei Park (just adjacent to the river), used to attract tourists, but that is no longer the case. They (politicians) have let this community down because they do not attend to these issues. I took an initiative together with other members of the community to clean the river and to stop people from dumping rubbish there. That is what leaders do!²⁸

This broken trust and the subsequent lack of effective relationship between residents and the formal leadership and authority have led many to opt to engage with informal community leaders whom they can count on. One such leader stated:

People would rather come to me as a community leader than go to the police station to solve their problems. Like now on my Facebook page two days ago, there was this grandmother whose house was broken into, they came to me and knocked, they woke me up instead of going to the police station because they know when I get there, I kick the door and check through my connections who was involved, and those things are recovered. We managed to recover the DVD that was stolen.²⁹

In addition to leading residents to rely on informal leadership structures to address conflicts and other issues of concern, the 'absence' of formal governance is also forcing Alex residents to take matters into their own hands. For example, Alex residents often turn to mob justice to deal with criminals because they cannot trust the police and the justice system (see later discussion on mob justice). Alex residents believe that the local formal institutions of authority and leadership are ineffective in resolving conflicts (Figure 4). They therefore rarely use

Figure 4: In your opinion, how effective are local structures in resolving conflicts?



²⁷ Interview, Thabiso, 19 April 2022

²⁸ Interview, Simon, 21 April 2022.

²⁹ Interview anonymous, 19 April 2022

them for conflict resolution: of surveyed residents, 37% and 41% never and only sometimes use formal local structure for conflict resolution, respectively.

In sum, the discussion above highlights Alex residents' frustrations, anger, and disappointments in the formal institutions of authority and leadership due to perceived inability and unwillingness to help them resolve conflicts and address numerous other issues of concern.

2.4 COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Collective or group violence is a common and longstanding feature of everyday life in the Alex. The most common forms of group violence in the township include political violence, xenophobic violence, taxi violence, mob justice, gang violence, and violent service delivery protests.

2.4.1 Political violence

Since the year 2000, the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) has noted an increase in the local government-related political violence, which in most cases has been directed towards municipal councillors and officials (Kanyane et al. 2019). Among others, these forms of violence include threats, intimidation, damage to political property, and political assassinations. Alexandra, with its multiple competing political parties dominated by the ANC, IFP, DA, EFF has had its fair share of political violence. Commenting on the history of political tensions in Alexandra, one participant said: "These days its better. In the 90s, there was always violence at Madala Hostels between members of the ANC and the IFP. That area has always been controlled by traditional leaders, the Indunas."³⁰

The desire and competition to control Alex has often resulted in fierce political rivalries and violence. In recent years, accusations of vote-rigging have often led to violence. One participant explained: "Usually, these parties fight against each other after the elections. As you know, in elections, its either you win, or you lose. The losers are the ones who always come out with stories that elections were rigged and so on, so they end up fighting."³¹In 2014, post-electoral violence flared in Alexandra, where an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) centre was torched by protestors. They complained that the recently held local governance elections were marred by vote rigging (News24 2014).

³⁰ Conversation (off record), Ma'am Dudu, 21 April 2022

³¹ Conversation (off record), Ma'am Dudu 21 April 2022

2.4.2 Violence against foreign nationals

Alex has an extended history of violence against foreign nationals (commonly known as xenophobic violence) which dates back to 1994. Since then, this type of violence has become a regular occurrence in the area. Xenowatch data indicates that, with at least 19 reported violence incidents (as of 23 September 2022), Alex has become a scene of repeated xenophobic violence and is among the areas most affected by this violence in the country.³²

The most recent attacks on foreign nationals in Alex happened in March 2022 and May 2022 and were largely led by the Alexandra Dudula Movement. Commenting on the recent waves of attacks on foreign nationals, one participant said:

The mission was to remove foreign nationals from the prime economic spaces at the Pan Africa Mall. Many shops there employ foreigners. The trading markets there are full of foreigners. The streets are also full of foreigners who are informal traders. The plan was to remove these foreigners and bring in South Africans. It turned out violent because of resistance.³³

The Alexandra Dudula Movement, a left wing of Operation Fiela³⁴ stepped out their operations to kick out ‘illegal’ immigrants in February 2022 by driving them out of their business trading stalls. Violent confrontations broke out as some immigrants resisted efforts to shut down their businesses (Simelane 2022). Several people were injured and trading stalls destroyed following these violent attacks (SABC News 2022). The movement members attacked foreign nationals in May 2022, and several stalls were gutted (Koka 2022).

These attacks were justified by some participants who complained that foreigners are taking away economic opportunities from South Africans. One participant stated: “If you go to Pan Mall right now, you will see what I mean. They have turned that place into their own. They operate without permits, they do as they please. We want those spaces to be occupied by our people.”³⁵ The participant further explained that the surrounding industries are ‘flooded’ with foreigners. He added:

The majority of people are angry here in Alexandra. Our community is blessed to have big companies in surrounding areas; we’ve got Sandton, Midrand, Kempton Park, Nimbrow Park and Germiston. When we go out seeking work, we do not get it. They prefer to hire ‘my friend’ from another country because they can pay them less. Foreigners have flooded our industries.

³² <http://www.xenowatch.ac.za/statistics-dashboard/>

³³ Interview, Swaz, 20 April 2022, see also <https://amandla.org.za/from-operation-fiela-to-operation-dudula-the-state-politics-and-xenophobia/>

³⁴ Interview, Swaz, 20 April 2022

³⁵ Interview, Anonymous, 21 April 2022

Apart from being blamed for taking up economic opportunities from the locals, foreign nationals are also blamed for problems of service delivery and or the lack thereof. The perceived growing number of foreign nationals, participants expressed, is putting a strain on the limited available resources such as healthcare facilities, housing, water and sanitation, and electricity, among others.

Despite claims that vigilante groups such as Alex Dudula Movement carry out their operations for the benefit of the community and South Africans, participants indicated this is not always the case. Actions are sometimes driven by members' self-interest. Participants indicated, for example, that Dudula Movement members forcefully evict foreign nationals from houses only to sell the houses back to the same people later. One respondent stated:

Our programme was hijacked by Dudula. They started to remove foreign nationals and outing people from those houses. [...] They started evicting people, and went back to them and said, we can sell the house back to you. They worked with immigration officials and SAPS. There was a woman who was staying with a Zimbabwean man in one of the houses. She kicked her husband out of the house because she wanted to possess the house. The Dudula members later came and kicked her out too...³⁶

An analysis of the political economy of xenophobic violence reveals that it is indeed common that groups instigate attacks on foreign nationals to further their own political and economic interests instead of those (interests) of the communities they claim to represent.³⁷

2.4.3 Taxi violence

As also noted in the original report, taxi violence is a regular occurrence in Alexandra. Over the recent years, several members of the Alexandra, Randburg, Midrand-Sandton Taxi Association (ARMSTA)) have been killed by assassins (Mangena 2021). According to respondents, the disputes and violence are usually over routes and commuters. For others, the violence is not motivated by routes and but is a form of expressing power and dominance of a particular ethnic group. While historically the majority of taxi owners were Zulus, there have been new competitors from other ethnic groups. As a participant noted: "The taxi industry used to be dominated by the Zulus, but now, there are other ethnic groups who are making their mark in the industry. Some of them are being silenced."³⁸ Taxi wars have become an endemic feature of post-apartheid South Africa and are not only limited to Alex (Dugard 2001).

³⁶ Interview, Swaz, 20 April 2022

³⁷ Misago, J.P. (2017). "Politics by Other Means?: The Political Economy of Xenophobic Violence in Post-apartheid South Africa". *The Black Scholar*, 47 (2); 40-53

³⁸ Interview, Vincent, 21 April 2022

2.4.4 Gang violence

As elsewhere, gangsterism in Alex is often linked to particular forms of crime and violence. Some gangs specialise in money heists (bank robberies and cash in transit heists), some on expensive jewellery, while others on electronic devices and internet scamming. As participants noted, gangsterism in Alex has evolved and has embraced the latest advances in technology. One participant said:

There are gangs in Alexandra. It's just that it has become more advanced. Even gangsters have changed. You have a gang that deals with defrauding bank cards, then we have those who deal with money heists. In 2017 there was a heist incident that appeared on the news. The leader of that gang was called Lerumo and he was very famous. Then there is a Rolex gang, they are from here around Alexandra. But here is the thing, most of them who started as gangsters own proper businesses now. We know them.³⁹

As the participant noted, the Rolex gang is notorious for robbing individuals and jewellery shops for Rolex watches. Another gang, known as the Plasma Gang, is popular for robbing Plasma Television sets from people's homes. The Plasma TV sets are not sold by this group but are rather broken down to access a specific powder/substance, which is used to make drugs.

One theme that emerged on gangsterism in Alexandra is what can be termed the 'migration of violence'. This refers to how foreign gangsters from the same country of origin are using Alexandra as their battleground to settle their scores. As one participant noted:

Gang violence is always there in Alexandra. There are shootings almost every day. You cannot stop the violence because there are different gangs, they are fighting for territories. You have those who are from Nigeria who are fighting amongst themselves for territory in Alexandra. There are those gangs who are from Zimbabwe, might be the Shonas and Ndebeles in Alexandra, but they are fighting over issues that are happening in Zimbabwe, so they are bringing their beef here.⁴⁰

The culture of gangsterism in Alexandra has also infiltrated its primary and secondary schools. In schools, the gangs are often identified by their tattoos, and the majority of them are involved in criminal activities such as stealing and selling drugs both on and off campuses. As one participant narrated:

So, in schools, the gangs are there and they now tattooing many of them, tattooing is now fashionable, and they have places where they smoke together, go together as a gang, and steal things to go, and entertain their girlfriends.⁴¹

³⁹ Interview, Thabiso, 19 April 2022

⁴⁰ Interview, Thabo, 19 April 2022

⁴¹ Interview, Thabo, 19 April 2022

Apart from tattooing their bodies, gangs also spray paint on some public infrastructures such as bridges or walls as a sign of claiming existence and territories. Others, as participants noted, hang up sneakers on power lines to indicate their drug-selling spots.

2.4.5 Mob justice

As indicated earlier, Alex residents often use mob justice as a way of dealing with criminals because they cannot trust the police. According to participants, many of the mob justice cases go unnoticed and unpublished, even on social media. Commenting on how criminals are dealt with by the public, a member of the CPF had this to say:

When it comes to mob justice, they will burn you alive, and the story won't even reach newsrooms or local newspapers. The streets are small, they will close the street, and they won't even allow the police to enter. By the time the police get access, they will only find ashes. Last year and even this year they burnt someone. Last year two people were burnt. The streets are small so police cannot enter when people block it, and the perpetrator can't escape as well. Even in March, they burnt someone on 2nd Avenue, here in Alexandra, there is mob justice.⁴²

Echoing the same sentiments, another participant added:

I think last month there was a boy who was killed just near the river (Jukskei). I also couldn't come out because it was at night. His killers had dragged him from a nearby tavern. They had tracked him in connection with various crimes he had committed in this community. They ripped off his stomach, leaving his intestines out. They left a note written, 'we found you, we have been looking for you'...⁴³

Mob justice is an increasingly accepted way of dealing with crime in Alex. It seems to be accepted even by the police, as it is sometimes carried out in their presence. One respondent recalled that two men were beaten by the community while the police were standing outside the yard. The community locked the main gate to the yard. Even when Dudula members were attacking foreign nationals at the Pan Mall, the police were there but didn't do anything to intervene.⁴⁴

2.4.6 Violence service delivery protests

As discussed earlier, poor service delivery and public dissatisfaction with the local authority and leadership often leads to violent protests. In 2019 for example, a major violent protest was organised under the banner of '#AlexTotalShutdown'. Alex residents embarked on weeks of protest action, "lamenting a lack of service

⁴² Interview, Floyd 19 April 2022

⁴³ Interview, Simon, 21 April 2022

⁴⁴ Interview, anonymous, 20 April 2022

delivery and corruption”.⁴⁵ The protest led to political tensions between the DA and ANC political parties, with each blaming the other for the appalling state of service delivery in the township.

III. Conclusion

Alex remains a highly diverse and rapidly growing community with a multiplicity of population groups, both citizens and foreigners. Meeting and competing in a space where rapid urbanisation and population growth are far outpacing service delivery capacity, these groups form relationships often characterised by conflict and violence, not only among themselves but with local institutions of authority and leadership. This research identifies the following main issues that affect social cohesion and have a direct or indirect causal relationship with collective violence:

1. *Socio-economic hardships*

Alex residents face severe socio-economic challenges, including, amongst others, shortages of public services due to poor services delivery, high unemployment rate, poverty, high crime rates, (collective and individual) violence, gangsterism, and drug abuse. The Covid-19 pandemic has made these already severe hardships even more bitterly felt. High unemployment rates -and resulting poverty- have made crime (often violent) a livelihood activity for many (particularly among the youth) in Alex.

Socio-economic challenges are an obstacle to social cohesion, particularly when they (at least some) are blamed on outsiders, as is the case in Alex. Poor service delivery, which residents attribute to incompetence and corruption by the local authority and leadership, leads to two types of collective violence: violent service delivery protests, and ii) xenophobic violence that often follows these protests

2. *Deficits in formal local governance and shift towards informalisation of community leadership*

This research finds a general lack of trust and working relationship between Alex residents and the formal or official institutions of authority and leadership, particularly the police and ward councils. This is because residents perceive these institutions as unable or unwilling to help them address numerous issues of concern, such as service delivery-related matters, crime, conflict resolution, etc. No wonder the general mood among Alex residents is often characterised by frustrations, anger, and disappointments.

This broken trust between residents and the formal local governance has led many to opt to engage with informal community leaders who seem to respond timeously to their concerns. This marks a shift from a

⁴⁵ <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-06-05-alexandra-timeline-from-the-shutdown-to-herman-mashabas-address-post-demolitions/>

reliance on formal authority and leadership to an informal governance and leadership system. In addition to leading residents to rely on informal leadership structures to address conflicts and other issues of concerns, the 'absence' of -or deficits in- formal governance -and the resulting lack of formal conflict resolution mechanisms- is also forcing Alex residents to take matters into their own hands. For example, Alex residents often use mob-justice to deal with criminals because they do not trust the police and the justice system.

Deficits in formal local governance is a driver of collective violence in two ways: i) it leads to the normalisation of mob justice (a type of collective violence) as an accepted means of addressing crime, and iii) formal leadership vacuums lead to the emergency of informal leadership groups that often use violence (e.g. violent service protests and xenophobic violence) to protect their lucrative (not voluntary) leadership positions (Misago 2017). Nevertheless, this research finds evidence that timely conflict resolution prevents violence.

3. *Collective violence*

Collective or group violence is a common and longstanding feature of everyday life in Alex. The most common forms of group violence in the township include political violence, xenophobic violence, taxi violence, mob justice, gang violence, and violent service delivery protests.

Collective violence is the most visible manifestation of social cohesion fault lines. It is also an obstacle to social cohesion as it exacerbates group tensions and undermines the prospects of peaceful interactions and cohabitation.

The findings discussed above and throughout this report suggest that, to be successful, any programme aimed at promoting social cohesion and preventing collective violence in Alex will need to address the obstacles the research identifies. They also suggest that, as these obstacles are interconnected and feed on each other, they must preferably be tackled simultaneously through a multipronged, multi-partner approach.

References

- Bhorat, H, and T Kohler. 2020. 'Lockdown Economics in South Africa: Social Assistance and the Ramaphosa Stimulus Package'. *Brookings* (blog). 20 November 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/11/20/lockdown-economics-in-south-africa-social-assistance-and-the-ramaphosa-stimulus-package/>.
- Businesstech, Staff. 2020. 'How Many South Africans Now Rely on Social Grants: 1996 vs 2020'. 1 October 2020. <https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/459186/how-many-south-africans-now-rely-on-social-grants-1996-vs-2020/>.
- City Population. n.d. 'Alexandra'. Accessed 7 March 2022. https://www.citypopulation.de/en/southafrica/cityofjohannesburg/798014__alexandra/.
- Dugard, Jackie. 2001. 'From Low Intensity War to Mafia War: Taxi Violence in South Africa (1987 - 2000)'. *Violence and Transition Series* 4: 46.
- Freedom House, 2017. *Addressing Frail Social Cohesion in South Africa's Diverse Communities*. Synthesis Report. Freedom House Southern Africa
- Harrison, Phil, A Masson, and L Sinwell. 2014. 'Alexandra'. In *Changing Space, Changing City: Johannesburg after Apartheid*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
- Kanyane, Modimowabarwa, Stephen Rule, Marie Wentzel, MA History, Johan Viljoen, MA Geography, Cyril Adonis, et al. 2019. 'Is Political Violence in Local Government a Threat to South Africa's Democracy?' Pretoria: South African Local Government Association.
- Koka, M. 2022. 'Cause of Alex Fire That Gutted 8 Stalls Unknown'. *SowetanLIVE*, 5 December 2022. <https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2022-05-12-cause-of-alex-fire-that-gutted-8-stalls-unknown/>.
- Kuagbedzi, F, N Dhlamini, and B Njenga. 2022. 'The Struggle of Women for Power and Leadership in Universities'. *University World News*. 28 April 2022. <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20220426094831132>.
- Mafisa, I. 2019. 'Waiting to Exhale: The Story of Alexandra Township'. *SowetanLIVE*, 18 October 2019. <https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-10-18-waiting-to-exhale-the-story-of-alexandra-township/>.
- Mangena, M. 2021. 'Chairman of the Taxi Association Murdered in Alex. We Have Compiled Stories of Taxi Violence That Occurred in Alex'. *Alex Reporter*, 30 March 2021. <https://www.alexreporter.co.za/2021/03/30/chairman-of-the-taxi-association-murdered-in-alex-we-have-compiled-stories-of-taxi-violence-that-occurred-in-alex/>.
- Misago, J, P. 2017. "Politics by Other Means?: The Political Economy of Xenophobic Violence in Post-apartheid South Africa". *The Black Scholar*, 47 (2); 40-53
- Morris, C. 2019. 'The Violent Work of South African Gangs - Christopher Morris'. *AIDC / Alternative Information & Development Centre* (blog). 8 July 2019. <https://aidc.org.za/the-violent-work-of-south-african-gangs/>.
- News24, dir. 2014. *103 Arrested in Alexandra, Johannesburg, for Election Related Violence*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3qnXpDhZds>.
- Phakeng, Mamokgethi. 2015. 'Leadership: The Invisibility of African Women and the Masculinity of Power'. *South African Journal of Science* Volume 111 (Number 11/12). <https://doi.org/10.17159/sajs.2015/a0126>.
- SABC News, dir. 2022. *Several People Injured in Alexandra Township as Dudula Movement Clashes with Foreign Nationals*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zA-omccXODk>.

- SASSA. 2021. 'Social Grant Performance as at End March 20/21'. Parliamentary Budget Office. https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/PBO/National_Development_Plan_Analysis/2021/june/03-06-2021/May_2021_Social_Grant_fact_sheet.pdf.
- Simelane, Bheki C. 2022. 'Violence Breaks out as Alexandra Dudula Movement Members Target Foreign Informal Traders'. *Daily Maverick*, 7 March 2022. <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-03-08-violence-breaks-out-as-alexandra-dudula-movement-members-target-foreign-informal-traders/>.
- Statistics South Africa. 2021. 'Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) – Q3:2021 | Statistics South Africa'. 2021. <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14957>.
- StatsSA. 2011. 'Alexandra'. 2011. http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=4286.

African Centre for Migration & Society
School of Social Sciences
University of the Witwatersrand
P.O. Box 76, Wits 2050, Johannesburg, South Africa
Tel: +27 (0)11 717 4033 | Fax: +27 (0)11 717 4040
info@migration.org.za | www.migration.org.za